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Intergroup violence is common among humans worldwide. To assess
how within-group social dynamics contribute to risky, between-
group conflict, we conducted a 3-y longitudinal study of the for-
mation of raiding parties among the Nyangatom, a group of East
African nomadic pastoralists currently engaged in small-scale war-
fare. We also mapped the social network structure of potential male
raiders. Here, we show that the initiation of raids depends on the
presence of specific leaders who tend to participate in many raids, to
have more friends, and to occupy more central positions in the
network. However, despite the different structural position of raid
leaders, raid participants are recruited from the whole population,
not just from the direct friends of leaders. An individual’s decision to
participate in a raid is strongly associated with the individual’s social
network position in relation to other participants. Moreover, non-
leaders have a larger total impact on raid participation than leaders,
despite leaders’ greater connectivity. Thus, we find that leaders mat-
ter more for raid initiation than participant mobilization. Social net-
works may play a role in supporting risky collective action, amplify
the emergence of raiding parties, and hence facilitate intergroup
violence in small-scale societies.
warfare | social networks | collective action | pastoralists | emergence
Intergroup violence is common, worldwide, and harmful. Globalannual deaths from large-scale warfare, for example, range from
0.5 to 1 million, and this does not include nonfatal physical and
mental injuries (1). A diverse set of approaches has been used to
study intergroup violence and warfare. Evolutionary models have
credited collective violence with an important role in the devel-
opment of modern human behavior (2–7), whereas cultural and
ecological factors have been shown to influence small and large-
scale violence (8–13). More recently, there has been increased
interest in understanding the dynamics of group-based violence
and the social processes that can contribute to it in the setting of
insurgent and terrorist groups (14, 15); for example, online records
suggests small, self-organizing groups coalesce into larger groups
preceding terrorist attacks (16). Warfare has also been studied as a
collective action problem—because individuals must mobilize to
engage in a group activity with shared gains (e.g., deterrence,
territory) and individual risks (e.g., injury, death) (17, 18).
Despite these advances, fundamental questions remain about
how violent groups are formed, and the extent to which they may
self-organize and emerge organically. Theoretical work suggests
interindividual differences may be important for initiating and
sustaining risky collective action, but empirical evidence in humans
supporting this is sparse (19, 20). Research in primate behavior
provides some clues regarding the emergence of violent intergroup
conflict. Wild chimpanzees engage in lethal coalitionary violence
against other communities (21), and a few “impact” individuals
show exceptional motivation to participate in intergroup interac-
tions (22, 23). Similarly, other primate species show interindividual
variation in initiating intergroup conflict, including lemurs (24)
and vervet monkeys (25). In these cases, the initiative shown by
such individuals appears responsible for promoting participa-
tion by others.
To understand how violence is initiated in self-organizing groups
of humans, we explore the role of social structure in collective
violence in a traditional, nonstate society. Such small-scale societies
offer an appealing opportunity to answer questions regarding the
emergence of collective violence because they are generally free
from formal institutions regulating conflict, such as are found in
modern nation states (26), and there is neither conscription nor
formal institutional control over violence. Unfortunately, field data
on collective violence in these contexts are rare. Most studies of
intergroup violence in small-scale populations have focused on the
mortality rate and demographic effects of warfare, rather than the
social precursors (27–29).
Although social networks are known to facilitate solutions to
collective action problems (30–32) and to have a role in the
emergence of both cooperation (33, 34) and violence (35), prior
work on the structure of social networks (36) and their role in the
emergence of violence in evolutionarily relevant populations is
limited. A study among the Yanomamö examined how copartici-
pation in lethal intergroup violence influenced alliances later in life,
finding that men who participated together in a killing were likely
to live together and exchange marriage partners (37). That study
provided important evidence regarding how participation in an
intergroup conflict can be used strategically to advance subsequent
relationships among participants; however, it did not evaluate social
networks or the group composition of raiding parties.
Significance
The social network structure of a small-scale society is crucial to
formation of raiding parties involved in violent between-group
raids. We mapped the social networks among Nyangatom men in
a defined area of Ethiopia and ascertained membership in 39 in-
tergroup raiding parties over 3 y. Although a small set of leaders
initiated raids, theywere not especially crucial for the composition
of the raiding parties; instead, aspects of social network structure
served to determine group composition and to amplify group size,
once a raid was initiated. Intergroup violence, like other forms of
collective action, depends on social structure and not just indi-
vidual agency. This is relevant to spontaneous violent activities in
settings as diverse as revolutions, gangs, and terrorist groups.
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To address how social networks influence the emergence of
violence, we mapped the social ties in a nonstate society in which
groups engaging in violent intergroup raiding formed organically,
analyzing the role of social networks in instigating and sustaining
intergroup conflict. Using observations derived from long-term
ethnographic fieldwork, coupled with detailed mapping of the
social network of raiding-aged men, we present data from a
complete set of 39 discrete intergroup conflict events among the
Nyangatom, a society of nomadic agro-pastoralists inhabiting a
remote region along the border of South Sudan and Ethiopia
largely outside the reach of state institutions (38, 39).
The Nyangatom
Many Nyangatom live in mobile cattle camps containing between
10 and 100 persons, and the population and number of these
camps are not fixed (38). Depending on seasonal variation, camps
may disband (with residents forming new camps) or they may
aggregate and form larger villages. The Nyangatom also have
semipermanent villages with dynamic membership, and movement
between camps and villages is common. Livestock have a central
place in the culture and diet of the Nyangatom and are necessary
for many social exchanges, including marriage. To marry, a male is
required to provide the family of the bride with bride wealth, often
30–60 cattle but sometimes as many as 100 cattle. Therefore,
livestock are highly sought after, and violent conflict with other
groups to obtain them is common (38–40). The Nyangatom also
have a distinctive social organization involving sequential gener-
ation sets and age sets (38); most males engage in activities such as
herding, socializing, and raiding with members of their age group,
creating strong social bonds between members (38).
The primary type of intergroup conflict event for the Nyangatom
is the raid (singular emojirimónu), in which a small group of men
attempt to locate and seize livestock from other nearby ethnic
groups, kill enemies they encounter when they can do so with
minimal risk, and then escape unharmed. Casualties among mem-
bers of raiding parties are unusual as they seek to minimize per-
sonal risk, but injuries and deaths of members of enemy groups
are common, and fatalities among raiders are not unheard of.
Successful raiders receive captured livestock (18, 39) and some-
times other social benefits, such as status, honorific names and
scars, and public praise (9, 41). Raids generally begin with one or
two individuals recruiting other participants, a process that typi-
cally takes several days. Raiding parties can also emerge when
large groups of young men are congregated, such as during a
ceremony. Individuals are not compelled to join a raiding party,
and many young men elect not to join; and there are no formal
sanctions for cowardice, desertion, or failure to participate (39).
Results
We used extensive semistructured interviews to collect information
regarding intergroup conflict events that occurred between the
Nyangatom and their neighbors. We comprehensively identified all
91 men residing in the study area who were of the appropriate age
for raid participation (∼18–45 y) and established group composi-
tion for a complete set of all intergroup raids initiated during the
study period (n = 39; Methods).
We measured a variety of attributes of potential raiders, in-
cluding height, weight, kin relationships, and measures of paternal
wealth (Dataset S1, Table S1). We also performed a compre-
hensive, sociocentric network study of this population of Nyan-
gatom males. To measure friendship ties within this group, we
used a gift task modeled on prior work with the Hadza hunter-
gatherers of Tanzania (33) in which Nyangatom were asked to
identify other study participants to whom they would like to give
an anonymous gift.
On average, there was one raid every 4.7 wk, and raids were
generally nonoverlapping in time, with raiding forays typically
lasting several days. Most of the population (78 of 91) participated
in at least one raid (mean participation, 2.9 raids; SD, 3.3). On
average, about 7 men (SD, 3.4) participated in each raid (Fig. 1A);
roughly 80% of raids in our sample were successful, resulting in
an average of four head of livestock (including cattle, goats, and
donkeys) being captured by each raider of a successful raid.
Measured individual-level characteristics were tested for associ-
ation with raid participation in bivariate models without controls—
including the number of siblings, height, weight, and measures
of paternal wealth (Dataset S1, Tables S2–S5). Although the
number of siblings, weight, and paternal wealth were significant
in bivariate models, none of these egocentric characteristics re-
mains significant in a multivariate model (Dataset S1, Table S7).
That is, we did not find evidence that these variables were inde-
pendently relevant to whether a person went on a raid. However,
a bootstrap analysis showed that the average weight of a leader
is higher than that of a nonleader (P = 0.010), whereas neither
the height (P = 0.468) nor the number of siblings (P = 0.364)
is significantly different between leaders and nonleaders (SI
Methods).
Fig. 1B shows a bipartite network of all 91 subjects and all 39
raids, with the five individuals identified as leaders on any raid
shown in red. Leaders were clearly the most participatory, and all
raids had at least one of these leaders. To complement the eth-
nographic data, we also used the raid participation data alone
(Fig. 1B) to conduct a “minimal set analysis” to independently
identify leaders (SI Methods). This analysis attempts to identify the
smallest group of individuals at least one of whom participated in
every raid. The procedure successfully identified all five individ-
uals that were named as leaders on any raid by participants. These
five individuals also participated in significantly more raids than
expected due to chance (all P << 0.001) as determined by a
procedure where we randomly reassign the identities of those who
participated in each raid while keeping the distribution of raid
participation fixed (SI Methods). Intriguingly, these results show
that leaders can be successfully identified from raid participation
data alone without prior information on the roles of each partic-
ipant. Because there was no raid that did not include at least one
leader, these results also suggest that leadership has an important
role in the formation of intergroup violence.
The social network of raiding-age Nyangatom men is shown in
Fig. 2, with those who did not participate in any raids shown in
green, those who participated in at least one raid in blue, and
leaders shown in red. Node size corresponds to the number of raids
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C D
Fig. 1. (A) Distribution of raid sizes over a total of 39 raids. The dashed red line
shows the mean. (B) Bipartite participant–raid network. Top nodes are people,
and bottom nodes are raids. Each raid has at least one leader. (C) Degree dis-
tribution (cumulative frequency) of the friendship network (red) and the av-
erage distribution of 103 random networks with the same number of nodes and
edges (green). The real distribution does not differ significantly from a random
graph. (D) Participant–leader raid relation network. A leader (Bottom) is con-
nected to an alter if the alter went on a raid with the leader.










in which a person participated (larger indicates more raids). The
mean number of incoming friendship nominations (in-degree) was
3 (SD, 2.7), and the range was 0–13.
Although in-degree is associated with both wealth and number
of siblings, the strongest predictor of the number of friendship
nominations is leadership status. Leaders have more than twice as
many friends (defined by receiving gifts) as nonleaders (5.2 vs. 2.4)
and the difference is strongly significant (P = 0.01). Leaders also
score significantly higher on a measure of network centrality, even
when controlling for in-degree (P = 0.04) (SI Methods). This
means that leaders not only have more friends but also that their
friends tend to be more popular, meaning leaders also have more
friends of friends as well.
We explored the ways the Nyangatom social network is similar
to certain other social networks by measuring a comprehensive set
of statistics (33). Although the cumulative degree distribution (Fig.
1C) does not appear to differ significantly from a random network
(P = 0.76), a number of other important properties are shared with
nonrandom social networks. Reciprocity (the probability that par-
ticipant B names participant A as a friend, given that participant
A names participant B) is significantly higher in the Nyangatom
network (reciprocity, 0.37) than in a random network (P << 0.001);
that is, there are significantly more two-way friendship ties in the
real network than a random network. In addition, at 0.17, transi-
tivity (the probability that two of a participant’s friends are friends
with one another) is also significantly higher in the Nyangatom
network than a random network with the same number of vertices
and edges (P << 0.001). Finally, there is also strong homophily (the
tendency of people with similar characteristics to have social ties
with one another) by age group (0.88, P << 0.001) (Fig. S1) and by
degree (0.10, P = 0.04). This homophily by age partly reflects the
fact that the primary social interactions for males in Nyangatom
society occur between members of the same age group; and our
assessment of social ties also shows stronger connections within age
groups than between age groups, thus supporting the validity of
the gift-giving task as a measure of social connections among the
Nyangatom.
Social network structure is highly relevant to the composition of
raiding groups, and membership in raiding groups does not arise by
chance. Fig. 3A shows that individuals with more social connections
(i.e., higher degree) tend to go on more raids, even when we ex-
clude the five leaders from the analysis and more popular nodes
(those with higher degree) tend to go on more raids (Fig. S2). Each
additional social connection is associated with an increase of 0.45
raids (SE, 0.17; P = 0.01) in the expected number of raids in which
a subject participates. In fact, regression models that include in-
degree, height, weight, wealth, and number of siblings show that
social relationship “capital” is more strongly associated with raid
participation than physical or material capital (SI Methods). Al-
though we expect that having more social connections leads to
more invitations or pressure to participate in raiding parties, it is
also possible that increased raiding contributes to a greater number
of social connections. Although wealth is associated with partici-
pation, the association becomes insignificant when we exclude
leaders from the model (SI Methods). Our measure of network in-
degree is the only variable that survives various model specifications.
However, the emergence of violent collective behavior is more
nuanced than leaders simply being linked by friendship ties to
nonleader “followers.” We used regression analysis to evaluate the
decision to join a raid, examining how this decision is associated
with the total number of other people who join the raid, the
number of one’s friends in particular who participate, and the
number of other leaders who participate (SI Methods). In these
models, we treated each individual’s decision to participate in each
raid as the dependent variable, and we assessed how the presence
of other potential raiders was associated with the probability that
an individual would participate in a raid. To control for unobserved
characteristics of individuals (e.g., their attitudes toward violence or
risk, as well as other personality factors) and of raids (e.g., the dis-
tance to the raid target or the anticipated value of the raided items),
we included in the model fixed effects for both individuals and raids.
Although raid size was not significantly associated with decisions
to join raids, leader and friend participation was. Specifically,
subjects were 6.8% (SE, 2.4%) more likely to join raids if they
were directly connected by friendship to a leader in that raid. If, on
Fig. 2. Network of friendship ties in Nyangatom society determined using
gift allocation task. Node size is proportional to raid participation (number of
raids in which an individual participated). Dark gray arrows indicate reciprocal,
two-way friendship ties, and light gray arrows are one-way ties. The age
structure of the population is also visible, insofar as there is a rough de-
marcation visible here between the “northwest” and “southeast” regions of
this network, with more ties within than between the two communities.
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Fig. 3. (A) Number of times people joined raids as a function of social in-
degree. Regression lines are shown for the full population (gray) (R2 = 0.32)
and excluding the leaders (black) (R2 = 0.42). People who participated in no
raids are green, nonleader participants are blue, and leaders are red. (B) In-
crease in probability of joining a raid based on geodesic social distance to
leaders and to nonleader friends. Lines denote 1 SE. The large positive coef-
ficients on first-degree connections show that direct nonleader friends are
more motivating than leader friends, and both are significant. The negative
coefficient on second-degree connections provides evidence against cascades
beyond 1 degree in raiding-party formation. Motivation did not extend sig-
nificantly to third-degree friends.
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the other hand, they were friends of friends with the leader (social
distance 2) or friends of friends of friends (social distance 3), they
were no more likely to join (Fig. 3B). This suggests that leaders
may be able to mobilize their direct friendship contacts to join
raids. However, further analysis yields the important observation
that, if so, leaders are no more able to mobilize their friends than is
anyone else in the population. Each nonleader friend who par-
ticipated in a raid increased the likelihood that a person joined by
19.2% (SE, 1.4%), which is significantly higher than the boost in
probability associated with leader friends participating (P < 10−5).
Although leaders appear to be less relevant than nonleaders for
predicting any one decision to join a raid, recall that leaders are
much better connected to the network. It is possible that leaders
may have less effect per person, but a greater total effect because
they are connected to more people. However, a test of this hy-
pothesis fails. In a model where we regress total participation by a
person’s friends on a person’s decision to join, their leadership
status, and an interaction variable that indicates the effect of
leadership on total mobilization, we find that significantly fewer
people join when a leader joins than when a nonleader joins (P =
0.008) (SI Methods). In other words, the key motivating factor to
join a raid once a raid is initiated is not leadership; it is friendship.
Social distance has an unusual relationship in the results for
nonleader friends (Fig. 3B). After controlling for friend partici-
pation, each friend of a friend who participates in a raid actually
decreases the likelihood a person will join by 1.6% (SE, 0.6%; P =
0.006). This suggests that people just outside of a person’s direct
social network may actually slightly demotivate participation in
raids; weak ties are apparently not useful for recruiting and may
even be somewhat detrimental. This also suggests that the men
indeed have different sorts of relationships with each other, even
within a population of just 91 individuals. The significance of these
associations survives models with various controls (SI Methods).
Finally, a model with sibling participation did not provide evi-
dence for siblings being more or less likely than chance to raid
with each other (P = 0.23) (SI Methods). Thus, it appears that
kinship did not influence raiding-party composition, consistent
with prior work with humans (37).
Discussion
A rich picture appears regarding the role of leadership and social
network structure in the emergence of collective intergroup vio-
lence in this evolutionarily relevant population. Leaders appear to
matter mechanistically, functioning as focal points or as nucleation
sites for raids among the Nyangatom. Although they participate
most often (the five leaders are the top five participants, by
number of raids), they are not particularly good at directly mo-
bilizing other participants. Instead, nonleaders have a critical role
in amplifying the size and specifying the composition of raids once
leaders initiate their formation. Although leaders may instigate
raids, they have no more influence than anyone else in promoting
participation. Moreover, our analysis of individual decisions to
participate in raids, using fixed-effects models, shows that social
network structure is key even when controlling for the “push” of
individual differences in the tendency to join raids and the “pull”
of differences between raiding parties that may make some parties
more appealing to join than others.
Our findings are also noteworthy because we did not uncover
ethnographic reports of formal sanctioning for nonparticipants.
However, it is possible that the withdrawal of a friendship tie is a
form of sanction (31). If so, then, the pattern of friendships may
itself depend on the willingness of men, at least occasionally, to
join raids together. Work among the Yanomamö suggests that
coparticipation in violence may result in subsequent formation of
social bonds (37), and men commonly enlist in the military with
friends and are often encouraged to do so in state-sponsored wars
(42). Future research should include repeated measures of network
structure to ascertain the extent to which collective violence also
shapes the network.
One important limitation of our study is that our network
measures only provide a snapshot of the social network at one
point in time, leaving open the possibility that coraiding led to the
formation of the social ties we observed rather than men opting to
raid with their friends. Nevertheless, based on the ethnographic
evidence collected, we think friendship is a primary mechanism
that contributes to coparticipation in a raid. Among East African
pastoralist societies such as the Nyangatom, young men engage in
many collective activities together, such as herding and ceremonies,
creating opportunities to meet other members of their age group.
As a result, they form very tightly bound cliques early in adoles-
cence that are an important part of social life. Raids are risky and
raiders are commonly nervous before a raid; this may be why in-
dividuals choose to raid with their friends rather than with people
they are not so well acquainted with (as our findings also docu-
ment, even within a relatively small population of 91 people).
Rather than acting primarily as a mechanism to generate friend-
ships with unfamiliar individuals, raids may instead act to deepen
friendships or be built upon them.
Important similarities and differences emerge between our
results and behavioral data on collective violence in other pri-
mates. Among wild chimpanzees engaged in group border patrols
and hunting, there is little indication that kinship influences the
likelihood or effectiveness of such collective action (43). Among
the Nyangatom, we also found no influence of sibling relation-
ships on raiding-party composition, suggesting alternative mech-
anisms for generating participation. This is also consistent with
the cognitive and social complexity of humans and with prior
observational work regarding the role of social ties in the emer-
gence of both collective violence (10, 37, 42, 44) and altruism in
humans (31, 32, 45).
Although we find that participation in raiding is widespread
throughout the population, there is also significant individual vari-
ation. A substantial portion of the population did not participate in
any raids, whereas five individuals participated in more than 10
raids and most participated in slightly less than 3 raids. The fact that
the initiation of raiding parties appears to depend on leaders who
function as nucleation sites for raids and who attract other partic-
ipants is consistent with research showing how individual variation
within a population can contribute to the resolution of collective
action problems (17, 20), including in risky, intergroup violence in
both humans and chimpanzees (46). Leaders may alter the costs
and benefits for others—either by reducing the costs of the raid to
other participants (e.g., via setting the time of the raid or by
scouting) or by exerting social pressure on others to join (18, 47–49).
In sum, we find that leadership matters in initiating collective
violence in this small-scale society, but that it is not an especially
important factor with respect to who joins the raiding parties.
However, violent group formation does not involve individuals
simply copying the risky violent behaviors of other members of their
group either; rather, social network structure matters in the for-
mation of raiding parties and in the emergence of such structured
violence. To the extent that Nyangatom raiding behavior mimics
the general phenomenon of risky collective action, we have iden-
tified an important amplifying effect: a handful of motivated indi-
viduals, with distinctive network positions, coupled with a wider
group of reinforcing individuals embedded within a network, can
lead to population-level violent effects.
These results might be relevant to other informal contexts in
which violence occurs, such as urban gangs (35), localized in-
surgencies (14, 50), revolutionary protests (10), or terrorist attacks
(16). Many types of violence do not depend solely on the desires
and actions of individuals or even dyads, and instead may at least
partially emerge and be supported by the very social structure in
which all individuals are embedded (51). These observations, fi-
nally, suggest two things with respect to the prospect of managing










violence. On the positive side, attenuating the impact of a leader
may prevent the original nucleation of the violence. However, on
the negative side, once violence is switched on, people are likely
to join from throughout the whole population, and so, once in-
stigated, violence has a wide-reaching effect on the society.
Methods
Data were collected as part of an ongoing ethnographic study of the Nyan-
gatom in which one of the researchers (L.G.) intermittently resided in the study
area in Ethiopia between 2009 and 2012.We used semistructured interviews to
collect information regarding intergroup conflict events that occurredbetween
the Nyangatom and their neighbors, including the Turkana, Daasanach,
and Suri.
We identified 91men residing in the study areawhowereof the appropriate
age to participate in raids (∼18–45 y). We conducted interviews with each of
these individuals, collecting data on their conflict history including both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful raids; raiding-party composition was validated
through peer reports. The presence of a raider on a raiding party was de-
termined by an individual’s participation in the raiding party for any portion of
it; we did not measure desertion, and some individuals may have ceased their
participation during the actual raid because they were afraid or for other
reasons. Leadership was ascertained by cross-validated personal accounts eli-
cited by questions about whether any person was a leader of the raid using
two Nyangatom terms for leader (singular Ekarikon; singular Eketamunan).
We also performed a comprehensive, sociocentric network study of the
entire population of raiding-age Nyangatom males (n = 91). To measure
friendship ties within this group, we used a gift task modeled on prior work
with the Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania (33) in which the Nyangatom
subjects were asked to identify other study participants to whom they would
like to give a gift of candy. Giving a gift is an important measure of friendship
in most societies (52). We chose candy as the allocation currency because of its
practical ease and because Nyangatom value it. Subjects were presented with
three pieces of candy and shown photo sheets containing the facial portraits
of study participants to whom an anonymous allocation could be given. They
were asked to indicate the three persons that they would like to receive the
gift of candy and told they would not be identified as the donor. All 91
subjects (100%) participated, yielding a total of 273 social ties within this
group, and distributions occurred only after all participants completed the
task. We also measured a variety of attributes of the study participants in-
cluding height, weight, and estimates of paternal wealth (SI Methods).
To explore associations between raid characteristics and raid participation,
we evaluated linear regression models that estimated the association between
an individual’s decision to join a particular raid and various raid characteristics.
The basic model is as follows:
E½Yir = θi + γr + βxir ,
where the dependent variable Yir is 1 if person i joins raid r, and 0 otherwise;
xir is a vector of characteristics for participant i and raid r; and θi and γr are
individual and raid fixed effects, respectively. We report results of the linear
model for more intuitive interpretation. The results are consistent in both sign
and magnitude compared with generalized linear models. See SI Methods for
further description of methods.
Approval for this study was obtained from the Harvard University Com-
mittee on the Use of Human Subjects; the South Omo Zone, Southern Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia;
and local elders. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
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